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STATE TAX REFORM FOR THE EIGHTIES:
THE NEW YORK TAX STUDY COMMISSION
by Richard D. Pomp*
If fashions in state taxation exist, now appears to be the season for
tax studies. It is a rare state that has not had some type of temporary
study commission.1 Although these studies and commissions differ
widely in their organization, budgets, subject matter, and approach, all
have one characteristic in common:2 they are a sign of a state's institu-
* Director, New York Legislative Tax Study Commission; President, Institute on Taxation and
Economic Policy; Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.S. University of
Michigan; J.D. Harvard University. Professor Pomp teaches courses in taxation. This article is
based on a speech delivered at the 1983 National Conference of State Tax Administrators. The
views expressed do not necessarily represent those of any group with which the author is
associated.
This article, reflecting the author's experiences with the New York Tax Study Commission. is
a testament to Dean Phillip Blumberg's willingness to indulge and support the faculty in their
quasi-academic pursuits. Once the Dean had become convinced that such pursuits would ensure
professional growth and had substantial intellectual content (no easy criteria to satisfy given the
standards that Phillip holds out for himself and, by example, for the faculty), his encouragement
and cooperation were unfailing. Moreover, during those inevitable enervating periods when one
was tempted to scrap professional growth and escape back to the bosom of the Law School, the
Dean proved to be a fount of comforting and perceptive counsel. By personally providing a model
of intellectual vigor and by creating an atmosphere that nurtured scholarly inquiry, Phillip's aspi-
rations were the faculty's inspiration.
1. States with recent or current tax study commissions include: Connecticut, see Tie BIPARTI-
SAN COMM'N ON STATE TAX REVENUE & RELATED FISCAL POLICY, FINAL REPORT (1983); Geor-
gia, see GEORGIA TAX REFORM COMMISSION COMBINED REPORT (1981); Hawaii; Iowa; Massa-
chusetts; Minnesota; Ohio, see JOINT COMMITrEE TO STUDY STATE TAXES, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1982); Pennsylvania, see PENNSYLVANIA TAX COM "m'N, FINAL REPORT
(1981); Texas; West Virginia, see A TAX STUDY FOR WEST VIRGINIA IN THE 1980's (1984); the
District of Columbia, see FINANCING AN URBAN GOVERNMENT (1978). For recent reports that
were not conducted as part of a tax study commission, see INDIANA'S REVENUE STRUCTURE MA-
JOR COMPONENTS AND ISSUES (J. Papke ed. undated); MICIIGAN's FISCAL AND ECONOIC
STRUCTURE (H. Brazer & D. Laren eds. 1982); STATE TAX PoLIcY: EVALUATING TIIE ISSUES (A.
Reschovsky, G. Topakian, F. Carr, R. Crane, P. Miller & P. Smoke eds. 1983); NEW YORK CrrY
BUSINESS TAX TASK FORCE, TAXES AND TAX POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY (1980).
2. Recognizing that state tax studies are a growth industry, the Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy recently sponsored a conference consisting of those persons who have been intimately in-
volved with such undertakings. The conference primarily focused on procedural issues involved in
a tax study commission and examined the roles of the governor, legislature, lobbyists, institutions.
advisory groups, public hearings, and the media. The conference also considered control of the
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tional weakness. Ad hoc, temporary tax study commissions are no
longer an adequate response to the dynamic nature of today's economy,
which requires the constant monitoring and oversight of any tax sys-
tem. Recent developments and trends present a challenge to the prem-
ises that underlie a traditional state tax system. State policymakers
have had to cope with changes in the judicial climate, 3 a relaxation of
federal controls, especially in the areas of transportation 4 and banking,'
research agenda and staffing of the study (e.g., central staff versus outside consultants). Finally,
particular studies were examined to determine whether they addressed major or limited policy
issues, whether they were intended to develop solutions to specific problems, and to what extent
the research was economic or legal in approach. Procedurally, the studies appeared to have little
in common, each being conducted in a different political milieu. More commonality of interests
probably exists with respect to substantive rather than procedural issues. The participants at the
conference seemed to agree, however, that, unlike an earlier generation of tax studies during the
1950's and 1960's, recent commissions deal with far more complex and sophisticated issues that
defy easy resolution.
3. Recently, the Supreme Court has been unusually active in addressing issues of state corpo-
rate taxation. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980) (uphold-
ing the imposition of Vermont's corporate income tax on dividends received by Mobil from its
subsidiaries and affiliates doing business abroad); Asarco, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458
U.S. 307 (1982) (striking down the application of Idaho's corporate income tax to the dividends,
interest, and capital gains received by Asarco); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue
Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982) (striking down the levying of New Mexico's corporate income tax on
dividends received by Woolworth from its foreign subsidiaries); Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983) (upholding California's use of a combined worldwide
report for Container and its subsidiaries).
4. States have traditionally taxed transportation activities on the basis of their gross receipts.
See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 184 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). The various rationales offered in
defense of taxing a business on its gross receipts, rather than on its net income, have never been
very satisfying. The recent relaxation of federal regulations involving airlines and trucking further
undermines the legitimacy and vitality of this form of taxation. For a detailed discussion, see N.Y.
LEGISLATIVE COMM'N ON THE MODERNIZATION & SIMPLIFCATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATION &
THE TAX LAW, STAFF REPORT, TRANSPORTATION TAXES IN NEW YORK STATE 21-23 (May
1983).
The case of Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii, 104 S. Ct. 291 (1983),
which prohibits state taxation of gross receipts that are attributable to the sale of air transporta-
tion, will require states using this common approach to formulate an alternative. The most logical
alternative would be to tax airlines on their net income under a specially designed apportionment
formula, a method that only a few states employ at present. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, §
3-304(a) (Smith-Hurd 1974). For airlines currently operating at a loss, taxation on their net in-
comes rather than on their gross receipts would result in a tax savings. For profitable airlines, the
switch to net income may or may not result in a savings, depending on the tax rate previously
applied to their gross receipts, the rate that would be applied to their net income, and the relation-
ship between their gross receipts and their net income.
A state should not re-examine its taxation of airlines independently of other sectors of the
transportation industry, such as trucking and rail, which compete for certain types of freight haul-
ing. Consequently, by forcing a state to restructure its taxation of the airlines, Aloha may help




startling advances in technology that have facilitated innovative busi-
ness practices,6 a flurry of federal tax legislation,7 the rise of multina-
tional corporations and conglomerates,8 and the shift in the economy
5. Banks have typically been subject to state tax regimes that arc different from those applied
to general business corporations. See. e.g., N.Y. TAx LAW §§ 1450-1468 (McKinney 1975 &
Supp. 1983-1984). The recent de facto and de jure deregulation or banking will eventually require
states to reconsider their existing approaches. As banks become increasingly involved in interstate
operations and undertake new activities that compete with brokerage houses, insurance companies,
and the real estate industry, the arguments for taxing banks in the same manner as most other
corporations become compelling. For a nontechnical discussion of the transrormation occurring in
the banking industry, see Carrigan, Financial Fracas, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1984, at 1. col. 6;
McMurray, Financial Fracas, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
6. For example, orthodox approaches to the definition and taxation of investment income may
appear simplistic when corporations have the ability to shift funds around the world nearly instan-
taneously. For a discussion of federal tax concepts that might be adopted by a state wishing to
revamp its taxation of investment income, see Pomp & Rudnick, Federal Tax Concepts as a
Guide for State Apportionment of Dividends: Life After Asarco, 17 TAX NOTES 411 (1982).
The increasing use of home computers will allow new modes of business operations, such as
video shopping, to flourish, which will make traditional concepts of taxing jurisdiction appear
atavistic. See infra note 8 for a discussion of video shopping and of Pub. L. No. 86-272. For a
perceptive article on the relationship between traditional concepts of tax jurisdiction and techno-
logical change, see Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Income Taxation-Recent Revolutions and a
Modern Response, 29 VAND. L. REv. 423 (1976).
7. States that utilize either a corporate or a personal income tax model those laws, with vary-
ing degrees of fidelity, on the Internal Revenue Code and thereby incorporate federal concepts and
definitions of gross income, adjusted gross income, taxable income, and so forth. Recent federal
changes that have caused states to question their emulation of the Internal Revenue Code include
the Asset Cost Recovery System, I.R.C. § 168 (1982), the short-lived rules on safe harbor leasing,
I.R.C. § (0(8) (1982) (before amendment by § 208(a)(2)A, (b)(l)-(4)), Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, and the taxation of social security benefits, I.R.C. § 86 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1984). See infra note 36 and accompanying text. If incorporated into state tax law, some of
these federal provisions would result in a loss in tax revenue without achieving any significant
state goal. Accordingly, many states have refused to adopt such changes.
8. Unlike the federal government, a state is not constitutionally permitted to tax a U.S. corpo-
ration on its worldwide income. A corporation can only be. taxed on that amount of income which
is fairly attributable to activities conducted within the state. Determining the amount of income
that is properly subject to a state's taxing power involves complexities that are greatly exacerbated
when corporations conduct their activities through several entities and in numerous jurisdictions.
The more complicated the corporate structure and the greater the number of jurisdictions in
which corporate activities occur, the more elusive the goal of calculating a state's legitimate share
of taxable income.
A fundamental policy decision confronting all states in dealing with conglomerates and multi-
state and multinational corporations is the extent to which separate but related corporate entities
will be honored for tax purposes. For example, should a parent corporation and its wholly-owned
subsidiary conducting similar businesses be treated as two unrelated taxpayers or should their
corporate veils be pierced and their operations combined for tax purposes? Although the rules
vary greatly, most states will either permit or require related corporations to file a combined
report of their operations, at least if only U.S. corporations are involved.
This principle of combining separate U.S. corporations conducting a similar busi-
ness--domestic unitary combined reporting-has been long accepted by both the courts and the
19841
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business community. The extension of this principle to foreign corporations-worldwide unitary
combination-has been more controversial. Worldwide combination is often associated with Cali-
fornia, which has been instrumental in developing both the conceptual underpinnings and the
administrative viability of the principle when applied to foreign corporations. In Container Corp.
of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld California's
use of worldwide combined reporting in a situation involving a U.S. parent and its foreign subsidi-
aries. Whether the court would uphold this method if applied to a foreign parent and a U.S.
subsidiary is unclear. See id. at 2956 n.32. (From the perspective of those who would oppose
worldwide combined reporting, Container was probably an ill-chosen case to have reached the
Court first because it did not present a very sympathetic fact pattern. A U.S. corporation owned
by a foreign corporation, and one that could have shown a greater disparity between the tax
consequences resulting from combined reporting and those which would have otherwise resulted,
would have presented a more persuasive case for the taxpayer.) For a general introduction to the
issues involved in worldwide combined reporting, see Church & Pomp, The Unitary Method:
Thirteen Questions and Answers, 10 TAx NoTEs 891 (1980).
Ultimately the Congress and not the Supreme Court is the arbiter of tax issues and, after
Container was decided, the controversy over worldwide combination shifted from the courts to
Washington. A working group was formed under the direction of Secretary of the Treasury Re-
gan, consisting of representatives from the states and the corporate community. The working
group's report should be issued shortly, but is unlikely to provide a definitive resolution.
This sequence of events may evoke a sense of d6ja vfi. In Northwestern States Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. State of Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), the Supreme Court upheld a state's right to
tax a corporation on its income arising from interstate commerce. After the decision, pressure was
exerted on the Congress to limit the case's scope. The result was Pub. L. No. 86-272 and a major
study, the so-called Willis Report. See H.R. RaP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964) (Willis
Committee Report).
Pub. L. No. 86-272 prevents, inter alia, a state from imposing a net income tax on the in-
come derived within its borders by a person whose only activities are the solicitation of orders. In
today's economy, an out-of-state corporation can achieve substantial market penetration and still
qualify for Pub. L. No. 86-272's exemption by soliciting through the use of radio, television, tele-
phone, and the mail; the statute thus appears to embody an antiquated concept of tax jurisdiction.
Recasting Pub. L. No. 86-272 in terms of a threshold level of gross sales above which jurisdiction
to tax would be deemed to exist would more equitably balance the interests of the states and of
taxpayers.
The need to revise Pub. L. No. 86-272 will be heightened as home computers become wide-
spread, which will allow out-of-state vendors to achieve even greater market penetration than at
present and yet remain exempt from income taxation. Using a home computer, consumers will be
able to examine a vendor's goods on a screen and, by using special programs or 800 telephone
numbers, to obtain immediate responses to any questions they might have. A sale will be consum-
mated through the use of a credit card or through an electronic transfer of funds from the cus-
tomer's account to that of the vendor. For a discussion of video shopping, see New Video Game:
Shopping, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1984, at Dl, col. 3. Over time, technological developments will
make the antediluvian approach of Pub. L. No. 86-272 increasingly obvious. For similar reasons,
National Bella Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), needs re-exami-
nation. For many states, federal changes in Pub. L. No. 86-272 and Bella Hess are probably more
important in terms of the revenue at stake than is the issue of worldwide combined reporting.
With the exception of Pub. L. No. 86-272, the Congress has shown little interest in adopting
legislation regulating the taxation of interstate commerce, although such bills are periodically




from manufacturing to services.'
The inherent weakness of a temporary tax study commission is
that by the time its recommendations work their way through the legis-
lative process, a whole new set of problems will have emerged. Recent
developments can easily overtake such recommendations and render
them naive. Needed instead is what might be called "institutionalizing"
the process of tax reform-imposing some kind of permanent manage-
ment system on the process of tax planning.10
Most states lack any meaningful institutional leadership regarding
tax planning and policy. One of the agencies that might be considered
a candidate to assume that role-the state tax department-is typically
too busy responding to each new crisis and is usually one crisis be-
hind." Legislative committees on ways and means or finance usually
9. The interaction between the shift in the economy from manufacturing to services and a
state's tax structure is graphically illustrated in the context of a sales tax. See Infra text accompa-
nying notes 13-27.
Some states grant investment tax credits, which favor capital rather than labor-intcnsive ac-
tivities, and these credits probably reflect a legislative desire to aid manufacturing. To the extent
that a state's economy is shifting from capital-intensive manufacturing to labor-intensive services,
the continued use of investment tax credits may be counter-productive. Even for states not under-
going this shift, investment tax credits may be misguided and merely divert legislative attention
away from more fundamental problems of economic development. See LEGISLATIVE CO,I.I'N O.
THE MODERNIZATION & SIMPLIFICATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATION & THE TAx LAw, STAFF RE-
PORT, THE EFFECT OF THE CORPORATE, SALES, AND PROPERTY TAXES ON BUSINESS LOCATIONAL
DECISIONS (forthcoming December 1984); Pomp, Kanter, Simonson & Vaughan. Can Tax Policy
Be Used to Stimulate Economic Development, 29 Ami. U.L. REv. 207 (1980) (proceedings of a
conference on state and local tax policy).
10. See M. MCINTYRE & 0. OLDNMAN, INSTITUTIONALIZING TIlE PROCESS OF TAx REFORM: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1975).
1I. State tax departments are commonly viewed as a source of expertise on all matters of
taxation, including policy issues. In reality, state tax departments usually have little insight into
policy issues, notwithstanding their considerable expertise in administrative areas. The skills
needed to administer a tax are simply different from, although complementary to, those needed to
design a tax. It is no more logical to assume that personnel in the tax department are knowledg-
able about the design of a tax system than it is to assume that personnel in the motor vehicles
department are knowledgable about the design of an automobile. To be sure, policy decisions are
inescapably made through administrative actions and this blurring of functions is not only inevita-
ble but also not necessarily undesirable. What should be avoided, however, is a situation in which
no agency or group is explicitly charged with developing a coherent and principled tax policy.
The weakness in relying on a tax department for policy analysis is demonstrated by a typical
lament of a study commission-inadequate data. Logically, a tax department should be a cornuco-
pia of useful data. Often, however, the criterion used for compiling data is whether they will be
useful in auditing taxpayers. Information critical for policy analysis may be unavailable if it is not
needed by tax auditors.
In some states, tax department officials purposely avoid policy analysis in order to insulate
themselves from "political issues." In these states officials often describe themselves as "techno-
crats" and try to sanitize the tax department by refusing to comment on proposed tax changes
1984]
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fare no better. Consequently, few states have a "game plan" for what
their tax system should look like today, let alone in five or ten years.
Because of this lack of leadership, a state tax system commonly
evolves (perhaps mutates might be more appropriate) through a series
of poorly researched or drafted laws that are often adopted in the clos-
ing days of a legislative session. These changes, typically Band-Aids
rather than major surgery, are superimposed upon existing law with
which they may actually be working at cross-purposes. Moreover, stat-
utes that have long outlived their usefulness nonetheless remain memo-
rialized. Regrettably, the result is too familiar-a tax structure that is
uncoordinated, complex, cumbersome, and lacking any conceptual
framework. The very complexity of the system may ensure that it can-
not be administered or implemented fairly or uniformly, thus accom-
plishing few of a legislature's goals.
Institutionalizing the process of tax reform planning is certainly no
panacea or guarantee that these problems will not continue. But the
creation of a permanent state body, perhaps somewhat akin to the Con-
gress' Joint Committee on Taxation, charged with protecting the integ-
rity and intrinsic harmony of the tax structure might be able to reduce
the frequency of piecemeal legislation and to coordinate the different
viewpoints of affected groups. This type of permanent body could un-
dertake necessary research and analysis, educate a legislature about
how the law is operating, evaluate alternatives, initiate proposals, and
draft legislation more thoughtfully and carefully than is usually possi-
ble. The need for such systematic planning is self-evident. Indeed, it
was partially this sentiment that led to the creation of New York's
Temporary Tax Study Commission. Certainly, the creation of a perma-
nent, rather than temporary, group is unlikely to be less effective than
the already feeble attempts that most states make toward tax planning.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON STATE TAX POLICY
One of the special characteristics of New York's Tax Study Com-
mission is the emphasis placed on the interplay between tax policy and
tax administration.12 A legislature often pays inadequate attention to
the administrative burdens it places on taxpayers and the tax depart-
ment; yet taxes are what they turn out to be in the real world and not
except for administrative considerations. See Kanter, Dorgan & Reschovsky, How State and Lo-
cal Tax Policy is Formed: Theory and Practice, 29 Am. U.L. REv. 271, 278 (1980).
12. Not all of the reports cited supra note 1, for example, particularly emphasize administra-
tive constraints on state tax policy.
[Vol. 16:925
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what a legislature intended them to be in an ideal world. "Good tax
policy" and "bad tax policy" can look remarkably similar if the law
requires a higher order of administrative capability than actually exists.
Issues of tax administration have too frequently played the role of a
stepchild to the favored child of tax policy. In many states the result
might be a total overload on taxpayers and tax administrators.
One source of these administrative problems in New York is the
very age of the state tax structure. The system is old enough to be
encrusted with both the wisdom and the folly of the ages and to serve
as the repository for whatever was the learning of the day. Instead of
purging the law, however, and ridding it of inconsistencies and anach-
ronisms, the legislature merely adds new provisions on top of old ones,
and taxpayers and the tax department are expected to deal with them
all. One of the many questions that the New York Tax Study Commis-
sion is raising is whether certain of these provisions are worth the ad-
ministrative effort that they require.
Unnecessary Distinctions in the Sales Tax Produce Complexity
The New York sales tax presents a very clear example of a law
that imposes formidable administrative burdens on both taxpayers and
the tax department in the pursuit of questionable goals and one that
perhaps has unintended effects. Although the state sales tax was
adopted in 1965 and appears relatively modern if compared to the rest
of the tax system, it was modeled with few changes after the 1935 New
York City sales tax. Its provisions illustrate a host of rather problem-
atic or moralistic judgments. Some are petty and chauvinistic: New
York State flags, for example, are exempt from sales tax, but other
state flags are not 13-- a provision that may well prove to be unconstitu-
tional if anyone cared enough to challenge it. Others present more seri-
ous questions of equity: baseball tickets are taxable, but Broadway tick-
ets are not.14 Other provisions may reflect more sympathetic legislative
goals, but nonetheless create significant administrative hurdles.
One glaring illustration, just the tip of the iceberg (icebergs, by
the way, are taxable if sold as ice, but would be exempt if melted and
transported through pipelines), 5 is New York's exemption for "drugs
and medicines." Any drug or medicine intended for "the cure, mitiga-
tion, treatment, or prevention of illness or diseases" is exempt from the
13. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1115(a)(11) (McKinney 1975).
14. N.Y. TAX LAw § 1105(0(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
15. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1115(a)(2) (McKinney 1975).
1984]
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sales tax."6 This wording may have been acceptable in 1935 when phar-
macies were not a cross between hardware stores and supermarkets.
Today, however, to administer this one provision requires the tax de-
partment to publish and continually update a list delineating the taxa-
ble status of over six thousand items.17 New Yorkers will be relieved to
know that this list resolves many of today's burning social issues. Prell
shampoo, for example, is taxable, but Head and Shoulders shampoo is
not,"8 presumably because the latter is intended to treat dandruff,
which is considered to be an illness or disease. Sterilized cotton is ex-
empt, non-sterilized cotton is not.' 9 Do such distinctions really achieve
any significant social goals? The Tax Study Commission's experience is
that most legislators are unaware that these distinctions exist at all.
But even if the legislature affirmed its desire to tax Prell and exempt
Head and Shoulders, are these goals important enough to justify the
costs of administration? Indeed, can the supermarkets and pharmacies
even implement the law?
A local NBC news affiliate must have asked the identical question
because it sent a reporter into seven different pharmacies. The reporter
bought the same basket of goods in each pharmacy and was charged
seven different amounts of sales tax. Not one amount, incidentally, was
for the correct sales tax, thereby providing a new twist on the concept
of a "tax lottery." 20 Some owners of pharmacies have told the Tax
Study Commission that they cannot afford to hire the caliber of em-
ployee needed to interpret the drug and medicine exemption and that it
is cheaper to negotiate the issue should it be raised on an audit.2 ' All
16. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1115(a)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). This language was presuma-
bly patterned after the deduction for medical expenses in the federal personal income tax. See
I.R.C. § 213 (1982). Theoretically, both the exemption in the sales tax and the medical deduction
in the personal income tax have the same goal: the exclusion of those items which do not represent
personal consumption. For a discussion of the role of a medical expense deduction in a normative
personal income tax, see Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309, 331-343 (1972).
17. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF TAXATION & FINANCE, PUBL. No. 820, TAXABLE & EXEMPT
DRUGS, MEDICINES, AND TOILETRIES (1979).
18. Id. at 16, 30.
19. See GOVERNOR'S TEMPORARY COMI'N TO REVIEW THE SALES & USE TAX LAWS, RE-
PORT TO rHE GOVERNOR: THE NEW YORK SALES AND USE TAX 161 (1979).
20. A recent survey conducted by the New York Consumer Protection Board indicated that
82% of the drug stores and 54% of the food stores were charging sales tax on exempt items.
Keeney, Sales Tax Inconsistencies Tax Merchants, Shoppers, Sunday Times Union, Apr. 15,
1984, at DI, col. 1.
21. Conceivably, a pharmacy having optical scanning equipment could program the tax de-
partment's list of over 6000 items so that the product's price would correctly reflect its taxable
[Vol. 16:925
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too often, auditors know that the drug and medicine exemption is likely
to be a fertile issue to raise. Owners of pharmacies have come to view
the exemption as part of a conspiracy in the restraint of understanding,
and the more cynical among them are convinced that the complexity of
the law is merely a disguised way for the legislature to raise money.
Putting the merits aside, clearly the drug and medicine exemption does
little to improve New York's "business climate."
The sales tax exemption for food presents another area where ad-
ministrative costs may outweigh social goals. Under existing law and its
interpretation, supermarkets must distinguish between fruit juices,
which are exempt, and fruit drinks, which are taxable.22 Is there really
an important policy being furthered when consumers can buy Tang
tax-free, but not Awake? 23 Should we feel proud to be citizens of a
state that exempts small marshmallows and taxes big marshmallows,
that taxes chocolate-covered peanuts but exempts plain peanuts? 24 And
on and on it goes from head to toe.25 Managers of major supermarkets
report that most consumers do not know or care whether an item is
exempt. Supermarkets may care a great deal, however, when a sales
tax issue is raised at an audit and no consumer is available from whom
the tax can be collected.
The common problem under most state sales taxes of distinguish-
ing between services (or intangible property) and tangible personal
property demonstrates how a shift in the nature of the economy can
challenge the very heart of a tax. The New York sales tax, like that of
most other states, treats tangible personal property differently from ser-
vices. Tangible personal property is generally taxable unless specifically
excluded, whereas services (or intangible property) are generally ex-
status. A provision in the tax law that requires this order of sophistication. however, must be
seriously questioned.
22. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1115(a)(1) (McKinney 1975). Supermarkets also confront all the
problems flowing from the drug and medicine exemption.
23. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF TAXATION & FINANCE, PUBL No. 880, TAXAoLE & ExEIwr
FOODS AND BEVERAGES (1983). See also New York State Sales and- Use Tax Regulation §
528.2(a)(4)-(5) (McKinney 1977).
24. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF TAXATION & FINANCE, PUBL No. 880. TAXAOLE & FXEIT
FOODS AND BEVERAGES (1983).
25. Foot powders that eliminate excessive perspiration are exempt because they prevent ath-
lete's foot, whereas foot powers that only deodorize are taxable; lip ices that prevent chapped lips
are exempt but suntan lotions that presumably prevent "chapped bodies" are taxable, even though
products used to treat sunburn are exempt. New York State Sales and Use Tax Regulation §
528.4(b)(3), ex. 8, 9, 11 (MeKinney 1977).
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empt unless specially enumerated. When sales taxes first became
widespread during the 1930's,2' most state economies were manufac-
turing- and mercantile-oriented, rather than service-oriented. The per-
centage of a state's gross product that resulted from the sale of tangible
personal property was no doubt far in excess of the percentage contrib-
uted by the sale of services. Under those conditions, it was perfectly
logical for a sales tax to be drafted with its primary focus on tangible
personal property.
Nothing in the logic of a retail sales tax, however, which theoreti-
cally should reach all final consumer expenditures, necessarily justifies
this distinction between property and services. Both can be purchased
by consumers for their personal gratification. Furthermore, because
tangible personal property embodies both capital and labor, most legis-
lators fail to appreciate that services are in fact already taxed under all
sales taxes if they are embodied in taxable property. The difference
between tangible personal property and services is really one of degree
rather than of kind. As states like New York shift away from manufac-
turing and towards a service-oriented economy, the traditional demar-
cation between personal property and services becomes subject to in-
creasing pressure and tension, forcing tax departments and taxpayers to
struggle with questions that are irrelevant.
The issue of computer software nicely illustrates this problem. Is
computer software taxable as tangible personal property or exempt as a
service (or as intangible property)-a wonderful metaphysical question
that has provided much grist for the law review mills. This intellectual
outpouring is regrettable because the issue should be irrelevant. A nor-
mative retail sales tax should not distinguish between personal property
and services, but rather between business inputs and consumer goods
and services. In other words, the fundamental distinction that should be
drawn is whether a particular good or service is likely to be purchased
primarily by businesses or primarily by consumers. Determining
whether software is a tangible good or a service requires both the tax
department and taxpayers to engage in a meaningless exercise.
26. N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1101, 1105 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-1984).
27. See J. DUE, SALES TAXATION 291-93 (1957); J. DUE & J. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION:
STATE AND LOCAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 2 (1983); STATE AND LOCAL TAXES 446
(0. Oldman & F. Schoettle eds. 1974).
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The Complications of Separate Income Tax Returns
New York's personal income tax shows how state law can be sub-
tly overtaken and rendered obsolete by federal developments. New
York's personal income tax was first enacted in 1919.28 At that time,
for purposes of the federal income tax, most married couples filed sepa-
rate returns in which each spouse reported his or her "own income., 29
For New York to adopt a similar approach of using separate returns
was perfectly logical. In 1948, however, when joint returns became the
dominant federal form of filing for married couples, New York law
remained unchanged. In New York, most married couples still file sep-
arate state returns, with each spouse reporting his or her own income
and deductions. The result is that New York taxpayers and the tax
department must resolve a plethora of issues that are simply irrelevant
for federal purposes, such as the attribution of income arising from
jointly-owned property. Because the Congress and the I.R.S. have had
little reason to consider the attribution of property income between
spouses, the corresponding federal rules are relatively undeveloped.
New York, however, requires exactly such attribution rules in order to
determine which spouse has received which items of property income.
Consequently, the state has had to shoulder the responsibility for ad-
ministering an important part of its income tax without federal
assistance."o
One way of discharging this responsibility would have been to
have written a detailed set of family income attribution rules to fill the
federal void. Instead, New York law states that "[i]f husband and wife
determine their federal income tax on a joint return but determine
their New York income taxes separately, they shall determine their
New York adjusted gross incomes separately as if their federal ad-
28. Art. 16, ch. 627, 1919 N.Y. Laws § 351.
29. See generally Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L REV. 1389
(1975); Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor In Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59
TEX. L. REV. 1 (1980); McIntyre & Oldman, Taxation of the Family In a Comprehensive and
Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1977).
30. See N.Y. LEGISLATIVE COMM'N ON THE MODERNIZATION & SIMPLIFICATION OF TAX AD-
MINISTRATION & THE TAX LAW, STAFF REPORT, THE STATE PERSONAL INCOME TAX: TAXATION
OF THE FAMmY AND Low INCOME RELIEF (July 1984). The discussion in the text dra s heavily
upon this report, which was prepared by Professor Michael J. McIntyre of Wayne State Law
School. This report concludes that the administrative considerations discussed in the text present
an overwhelming case on behalf of the adoption of a joint return in New York. A joint return with
full income splitting, similar to the federal approach from 1948 to 1971, would not involve the so-
called "tax on marriage."
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justed gross incomes had been determined separately."'31 The effect of
this provision is to incorporate into New York law all the uncertainties
and petty distinctions that characterized the federal system of marital
income attribution rules prior to 1948, but without the benefit of assis-
tance by the I.R.S. and the federal courts in resolving fresh disputes.
The uncertainties of the pre-1948 federal system are difficult to
overstate and are nicely captured by considering the common joint sav-
ings account. A recent federal revenue ruling states that "[flor federal
income tax purposes, if two or more persons hold a savings account as
joint tenants, the interest earned is owned by each person to the extent
that each tenant is entitled under local law to a share of such in-
come. ' '32 For New York spouses, therefore, the proper taxpayer on a
joint savings account turns first on whether the husband and wife hold
the account as joint tenants, and second, on the rights of joint tenants
under state law. Under New York law, income from joint accounts is
taxable in equal share to the joint tenants, but only if they do nothing
to change their initial one-half ownership rights. The most common
way to change those rights would be for one spouse to withdraw money
from the account. By withdrawing money from a joint account, a joint
tenant thereby reduces his or her rights to the balance, unless the with-
drawal was made for the joint benefit of the tenants or represented a
gift from one tenant to the other. Realistically, the rights of joint te-
nants in an active savings account with many deposits and withdrawals
are essentially unknowable, at least for a tax department with limited
resources. The practical result in many cases is that married taxpayers
can divide their interest income between themselves and report it on
their separate state income tax returns in the most advantageous man-
ner possible without challenge by the tax department. Because the
manner in which the couple divides their interest income for New York
purposes is irrelevant for federal purposes if they file a joint return,
neither a couple's federal joint return nor any other information the
I.R.S. is likely to have is useful to the state tax department in deter-
mining how the interest income should have been reported by the
spouses.
Equally difficult problems arise in determining who the proper tax-
payer is regarding income received from property held as tenants in
common or as tenants by the entirety. Without any fully developed fed-
31. N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(0 (McKinney 1975).
32. Rev. Rul. 76-97, 1976-1 C.B. 15, 16.
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eral rules and without any assistance from the I.R.S., the New York
Tax Department is generally forced to accept without challenge the
income attribution positions taken by married persons on their New
York tax returns. The result is that in the case of wages, couples have
very little opportunity to shift income to a spouse subject to a lower
marginal tax rate, but they can shift property income by resolving
many of the gray areas of the law in their favor.
Similar attribution problems arise in the allocation of capital gains
and losses between spouses. The federal rules for reporting capital
gains and losses on a separate return suffer from the same ambiguities
and lacunae that characterize the issue of which spouse should report
property income. Venturesome New York taxpayers can interpret the
law so that they treat the spouse subject to the higher state marginal
tax rate as the "owner" of any property generating a loss, and treat the
lower rate spouse as the "owner" of property generating a gain. It is
unrealistic to expect the New York Tax Department to have the capac-
ity to determine the true ownership of the property in these cases and
no guidance is forthcoming from the I.R.S. because, again, if a joint
return is filed, the issue is irrelevant for federal purposes.
Sophisticated lawyers and accountants know how ambiguous fed-
eral law is regarding the attribution of property income and that these
ambiguities can be resolved in favor of their clients. Indeed, as the joint
savings account example indicates, a detailed inquiry into which spouse
should properly report which items of income might actually cost both
the state and the taxpayer more than the amount at stake. Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, taxpayers often resolve the problem by allocating prop-
erty income in the most advantageous manner possible.
New York's use of separate returns also means that the state is
susceptible to all the tax avoidance techniques that were rendered inef-
fective at the federal level when joint returns were adopted. Consider,
for example, a married couple having just one income-earner. This
couple can reduce its state tax if its income is equally divided between
the spouses. One technique for achieving this result is to have the
higher-income spouse borrow money from the lower-income spouse at
the highest defensible rate of interest. The higher-income spouse re-
ceives an interest deduction and the lower-income spouse reports the
interest as income. Enough money is borrowed until the marginal tax
rate of each spouse is equal. In this manner, the couple minimizes its
state income tax. This strategy is cost-free at the federal level because
in a joint return the interest income of the creditor-spouse is completely
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offset by the interest deduction of the debtor-spouse, resulting in a
wash. The I.R.S. has no reason to inquire into whether a bona fide loan
even exists between the spouses. The New York Tax Department is
unable to monitor this situation, nor should it be expected to do so. The
result is what might be called "self-help income-splitting" for the well-
advised. 33
In addition to the administrative complications and burdens that
arise from the use of separate returns, another equally significant prob-
lem results. Because nearly all married couples file joint returns at the
federal level, tax legislation is drafted focusing primarily on this group.
The impact of changes on married persons filing separately is simply of
secondary importance to the Congress, notwithstanding its critical im-
portance for New York taxpayers.
The recent changes in the taxation of social security benefits prove
that the federal treatment of married couples filing separate returns
can have an unintended, but dramatic consequence for New York.
These recent federal changes generally tax up to one-half of a recipi-
ent's social security benefits in excess of a base amount.3 The base
amount is $25,000 for single persons and $32,000 for married persons
filing a joint return. For married persons filing separate returns, how-
ever, the base amount is zero. In other words, for federal purposes, a
married individual filing a separate return is taxable on one-half of the
first dollar received of social security benefits because no base amount
is applicable. Whatever the federal rationale for this result, the unin-
tended effect in New York is to tax married individuals filing separate
state returns on one-half of the first dollar received of their social se-
curity payments because this would be the treatment if they had filed
separate returns federally."' Although New York law was recently
33. For other techniques of income-splitting that are available under a separate return system,
see N.Y. LEGISLATIVE COMM'N ON THE MODERNIZATION & SIMPLIFICATION OF TAX ADMINIS-
TRATION & THE TAX LAW, STAFF REPORT, THE STATE PERSONAL INCOME TAX: TAXATION OF
THE FAMILY AND Low INCOME RELIEF 12-17 (July 1984).
34. See I.R.C. § 86 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984).
35. A similar problem used to arise in New York's taxation of unemployment compensation,
For federal purposes, part or all of a recipient's unemployment compensation in excess of a base
amount is taxable. See I.R.C. § 85 (1982). The base amount is zero for married taxpayers who
file separate returns and who do not live apart at all times during the taxable year. Id. § 85(b)(3).
For New York purposes, such taxpayers used to be taxable on their first dollar of unemployment
compensation, for the reasons discussed in the text. New York law was recently changed, however,
to tax only the amount that is taxable federally. N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(0 (MeKinney 1975),
amended by 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 71, § 2.
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changed to exempt social security benefits from income taxation, 30 the
need to respond at all to the federal change indicates the type of prob-
lem that can arise when a state's approach is out of harmony with the
federal approach.
State Tax Expenditures
Another source of administrative difficulties is tax expendi-
tures-those special credits, exemptions, and deductions which are not
part of the normative structure of a tax but are used to achieve extra-
neous goals.37 A provision that exposes the foibles of using a tax expen-
36. N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(c)(3-b) (McKinney Supp. 1983). The taxation or social security
benefits generates vehemently emotional opposition, notwithstanding the considerable logic that
can be mustered in its defense. See. e.g., J. PECHNIAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 90-92 (1971); Sun-
ley, Employee Benefits and Transfer Payments, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 75 (J.
Pechman ed. 1977); R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 103-07 (1964). The Governor of
New York pledged that he would exempt social security benefits from state taxation, and, al-
though there was some dissent and debate, election-year politics assured that the legislature would
endorse his position.
Overlooked in the New York debate was the state's exemption from taxation of the first
S20,000 of pension income received by persons over 59 YI years of age. See N.Y. TAX LAw § 612
(c)(3-a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). An alternative to exempting social security benefits would
have been to have classified the amount taxable federally as pensidn income for state purposes.
The combination of the federal base amount of $32,000 and the S20,000 New York pension ex-
emption would have meant that very few taxpayers would have had their social security bencfits
subjected to state taxation. Those who would have paid some tax would have had more than
$32,000 of adjusted gross income and more than S20,000 of pension income-not exactly the
proverbial "poor little old widows" who are traditionally conjured up in debates over the taxation
of social security benefits.
Treating social security benefits as pension income would have had a strategic advantage
from the perspective of the Tax Study Commission. The current 520,000 pension exemption vio-
lates principles of horizontal equity and, because income is taxed at progressive rates, has the
perverse effect of being worth more to upper-income taxpayers than to lower-income taxpayers. If
the legislature were persuaded to modify or eliminate the exemption, such changes would auto-
matically apply to social security benefits if they had been treated as pension income. If, after
exempting such benefits, the legislature were to decide to modify its treatment of pension income,
the taxation of social security will have to be debated afresh.
37. The tax expenditure concept was developed by Professor Stanley S. Surrey and was based
on his experience as Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, as
well as on the insights garnered through his academic and scholarly pursuits. The concept has
been described as the "major innovation in tax and public finance during the last twenty or thirty
years." Kierans, The Tax Reform Process: Problems of Tax Reform, 1 CAN. TAX. 22 (1979).
Since 1968, the United States has published a tax expenditure budget estimating the revenue loss
attributable to tax expenditures in the federal personal income tax. See BUDGET OF THIE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G (1984). A number of states also publish a tax expen-
diture budget, including California, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Massachusetts is developing a simi-
lar budget, as are a number of foreign countries.
The literature on tax expenditures is voluminous; for a small sampling, see S. SURREY, PATH-
WAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973); J. WILLIS & P. HARDWICK, TAX EXPENDITURES IN THE UNITED
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diture at the state level is New York's so-called PASS (Parents' and
Students' Savings) fund.38 Under this plan, a taxpayer receives a $750
deduction for money transferred to a qualified higher education fund.
The income accruing to this PASS fund is completely exempt from
state income tax, although not necessarily free of federal income tax.
Money can be withdrawn from the fund and used to pay the college
expenses-of eligible beneficiaries who are usually dependents of the par-
ent creating the PASS fund. After finishing college, the beneficiary is
taxable over a five-year period on funds used to pay his or her expenses.
Presumably, the purpose of the fund is to encourage persons to
save for the college expenses of their dependents. Using the tax system
to encourage this goal, however, is inefficient in a number of respects.
First, the benefit of the deduction is equal to its amount multiplied by
the marginal tax rate of the taxpayer. Because the New York income
tax uses progressive rates, the deduction is worth more to upper-income
persons than to lower-income persons. For a taxpayer subject to the
highest marginal tax rate in New York-fourteen percent-the $750
deduction is worth $105 ($750 x 14%). For an individual subject to the
lowest marginal tax rate of two percent, the deduction is worth only
$15 ($750 x 2%). For a person too poor to be subject to the personal
income tax at all, the deduction is worthless. The deduction thus has a
perverse aspect to it, because the richer the taxpayer, the more the
benefit; yet the richer the taxpayer, the less the need for a tax incentive
to save for college expenses.3 9
This method is inefficient even assuming that the deduction was
intended to help upper-income taxpayers more than lower-income tax-
payers. ° State and local taxes are itemized deductions for purposes of
KINGDOM (1978); International Fiscal Association, Tax Incentives as an Instrument for Achieve-
ment of Government Goals, LXIa CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL (30th International
Congress 1976); McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure, 14 U.CD.
L. REV. 79 (1980); and the references cited in S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H.
AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 257, 292-93 (1972 & Supp, 1983).
For a popularized version of the tax expenditure concept, see P. STERN, THE RAPE OF TIlE TAX-
PAYER (1973).
38. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(k) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
39. The perverse upside-down effect of the existing deduction could be eliminated by con-
verting it into a credit. A credit would benefit all taxpayers equally, regardless of their respective
marginal tax brackets. To provide assistance to those taxpayers who have no income tax liability,
the credit would have to be refundable. The use of a credit, although an improvement over the use
of a deduction, would still not assure that the PASS accounts would satisfy a cost-benefit analysis.
40. Politically, imputing this motive to the legislature might not be wide of the mark, which
exposes yet another dimension of tax expenditures: the ability to adopt an implicit spending pro-
gram that would be difficult to pass if it were proposed as an explicit program. For example, how
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the federal personal income tax and thus some of the benefit of the
state tax savings is "appropriated" by the federal government. In other
words, for a taxpayer who itemizes, the reduction in state personal in-
come tax that results from the $750 deduction increases the amount of
personal income taxes paid at the federal level. Assume, for example,
that the New York taxpayer is in the fifty percent marginal tax bracket
for federal purposes and itemizes his or her personal deductions. The
$105 maximum state tax savings ($750 x 14%) increases the taxpayer's
federal taxes by $52.50 ($105 x 50%). Consequently, the $105 of state
savings is reduced by half to only $52.50. Using the state tax system to
encourage savings is therefore inefficient because New York must forgo
$105 of its own revenue in order for the taxpayer to save $52.50. A
perverse form of revenue sharing results since the federal government is
the beneficiary of up to one-half of the revenue forgone by the state.
Had the state decided to use the $105 to finance tax-free scholar-
ships,41 each dollar of revenue given up by New York would have actu-
ally resulted in a dollar of benefit to the recipient.
The $750 deduction is inefficient in yet another respect. As a per-
centage of the cost of college, the modest net reduction in taxes is un-
likely to affect any parent's decision to save. Admittedly, most taxpay-
ers would rather pay a reduced tax than not, even if the reduction is
modest, but the only relevant inquiry is whether the PASS plan actu-
ally encourages taxpayers to save more than they otherwise would.
Quite possibly, the deduction does not increase the overall amount of
money saved for college but only shifts money into PASS accounts
from other investment vehicles, such as money market funds, certifi-
cates of deposit, or passbook savings accounts.
The deduction is also inefficient as a matter of tax planning. For
sympathetic a hearing would Legislator X receive if he or she proposed an explicit spending pro-
gram to assist parents in saving for the higher education costs of their children, but one that gave
more assistance to upper-income taxpayers than to lower-income taxpayers and that provided no
assistance whatsoever to the very poorest?
41. See I.R.C. § 117 (1982). If the state wished, the scholarships could be earmarked for the
children of those income groups who benefit the most from the existing deduction. More generally,
every tax expenditure could be replaced by its equivalent spending program. A spending program,
even if equivalent in effect to a tax expenditure, has two additional advantages-visibility and
accountability. For example, if the state replaced its PASS accounts with a program of scholar-
ships, it would have to decide on the appropriate level of funding. At present, the revenue forgone
through the use of PASS accounts is not determined by the state, but rather by the number of
taxpayers who avail themselves of the program. The PASS plan thus represents an unlimited




federal tax purposes, the income accruing to PASS funds will most
probably be taxable to the parent.42 A taxpayer motivated by tax con-
siderations is better advised to create a trust that would shift income
from the parent for both federal and state purposes. Alternatively, par-
ents might make interest-free loans to their children, who can then in-
vest the principal, pay tax on the income at their lower tax rates, and
use the remaining money for their college expenses." Of all the tech-
niques available, the PASS fund is likely to rank low on a tax planner's
list.
Evidently, most taxpayers agree with this analysis because PASS
funds have not resulted in a large revenue loss to New York. But an-
other cost must be taken into account, a cost that is typically over-
looked by the legislature-the administrative expense incurred by the
tax department in implementing the PASS program. Regardless of how
few persons actually take advantage of the $750 deduction, the tax de-
partment nevertheless had to develop special forms, regulations, and
instruction booklets and had to train its staff regarding the use of
PASS funds. A host of questions had to be resolved. For example, who
can be a trustee of a PASS fund: the parent, the beneficiary, or only a
disinterested third party? What kinds of assets can be contributed to
such a fund: only cash or also appreciated property? What types of
schools can a student attend: technical schools, correspondence schools,
schools abroad, or those on the high seas? What are the expenses for
which the proceeds from a fund can be used: the costs of books, home
computers, educational travel? How can the state be assured that the
beneficiaries will actually report their use of funds from the PASS ac-
count five years after graduation, especially if they are nonresidents at
that time?
The tax department's regulations and brochure on PASS funds re-
present an intellectual tour de force." The question, however, is
42. The federal tax treatment of PASS funds is obviously independent of state tax law. The
federal tax consequences are controlled by I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (1982).
43. In Dickman v. Comm'r, 104 S. Ct. 1086 (1984), the Supreme Court held that an interest-
free demand loan constituted a taxable gift. Generous statutory exemptions from the gift tax exist,
however, which limit the impact of the case for many taxpayers. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2503(b),
2503(e), 2513(a) (1982). See also I.R.C. § 2505 (1982). In Dickman, the Court assumed that an
interest-free demand loan would successfully shift income from the creditor to the debtor. Such an
assumption, however, is highly questionable. See Joyce & DelCotto, Interest-Free Loans: The
Odyssey of a Misnomer, 35 TAX L. REv. 459 (1980). The tax planning technique described in the
text is safest when the interest-free loan involves a term greater than ten years.
44. NEW YORK STATE & CITY OF NEW YORK, PUBL. No. 320, TUITION DEDUCTION AND
THE PASS PLAN (1982); New York State Personal Income Tax Regulations §§ 100.8; 145.16;
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whether all this effort is a worthwhile use of the department's limited
resources. Should New York be enacting these kinds of laws that divert
the tax department's limited resources from revenue raising functions?
The PASS account is just one example of a state tax expenditure;
investment tax credits,45 employment incentive credits,40 and special
treatment of investments in new small businesses47 represent other, and
more costly, examples of provisions directed at economic development.
The temptation to use the tax system in this manner is easy to under-
stand. Any legislature has only limited tools for intervening in a state's
economy, which is primarily at the mercy of the national economy.
Legislators are often frustrated at not being able to alter or control
significantly the course of economic events, and the temptation to do
something (or to be perceived as doing something) about the state's
economy is so great that many special tax incentives get adopted with-
out any analysis or research. Because of the political pressure to adopt
these measures, the burden of proof is often not on those who propose
such incentives, but rather on those spoilsports who would oppose them
until evidence is presented indicating their effectiveness.4 It is during
152.16; TSB-M-79(1)I; TSB-M-79(3)I.
45. N.Y. TAX LAw § 210(12)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
46. Id. § 210(12-A).
47. Id. § 612(o)(1).
48. For an attempt at measuring the effectiveness of these provisions using computer modeling
and microsimulations, see LEGISLATIVE COMW'N ON THE MODERNIZATION & SIIPLIFICATION OF
TAX ADMINiSTRATION & THE TAX LAW, STAFF REPORT, THE EFFECt OF STATE TAXATION ON
BUSINESS LOCATIONAL DECISIONMAKING (July 1984). This report underscores and reinforces
nearly three decades of learning indicating that state taxation does not play a significant role in
business locational decisionmaking. The reason that legislative forays into the business tax laws of
the state are unlikely to be successful can be summarized as follows. First, innumerable factors
are important to a business in its decision where to locate. Depending on the type of business at
issue, the locational decision can be influenced by plant or site availability, access to transporta-
tion, quality of labor, proximity to markets and supplies, access to utilities, regulatory environ-
ment, quality of a state's schools, colleges or universities, availability of housing, or a state's ambi-
ance and quality of life. In any particular situation, one or more of these considerations may be
determinative.
Second, taxes are one of the many costs of doing business, and the magnitude of these other
costs may easily swamp the amount of state taxes involved. For example, based on an analysis by
the staff of the New York Tax Study Commission of those corporations which allocate their in-
come for purposes of the state franchise tax, a group that contributes approximately 70% of the
corporate tax revenues, labor costs in New York are 53 times as large as their state corporate tax
payments. A 2% wage differential is equivalent, therefore, to a 106% corporate tax differential.
For a labor-intensive corporation, a few pennies difference in the hourly wages paid to employees
might reduce its costs by more than any conceivable tax savings that would result from locating in
one state rather than another. Indeed, many studies have concluded that regional differences in
labor costs, construction costs, and energy costs are generally too large to be offset by differences
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periods of slow economic growth that the pressure to institute these
in tax levels. See, e.g., G. CORNIA, W. TESTA & F. STOCKER, STATE-LOCAL FISCAL INCENTIVES
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Urban and Regional Development Series No. 4, Academy for
Contemporary Problems 1978).
Third, state and local tax payments are deductible for purposes of the federal corporate in-
come tax. The effect of this deduction, the so-called federal offset, is to reduce both the absolute
burden of state and local taxes and the differences in burdens among the states. For example,
consider a corporation subject to a 46% federal corporate marginal tax rate. Assume that this
corporation is deciding whether to move from State A to State B. Taxes would be $200 in State A
but would be only $100 in State B, a $100 difference. After taking into account the federal offset,
however, the out-of-pocket cost of state taxes is $108 in State A and $54 in State B. The net
difference in taxes between A and B is reduced to $54 ($108-$54), from $100 ($200-$100).
The effect of the federal offset has another important implication for policymakers. Because
the federal offset reduces the value of the tax benefit that accrues to a firm from a reduction in its
state taxes, some researchers have concluded that corporations favor government expenditures,
such as job training and screening programs and improved transportation, over tax abatements.
The former, provided they do not merely reduce costs the taxpayer would have otherwise incurred,
provide tax-free benefits to a corporation whereas a similar amount of tax abatement may be
offset in part by an increase in its federal corporate income tax. See. e.g., Wheeler, Interstate
Differences in Tax Costs to Corporations: A Look at Some Accounting Studies, in MICIIIOAN'S
FISCAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 1, at 257. From the perspective of a state, a tax
incentive is an inefficient way to grant relief to a corporation. A state may forgo $2 in revenue; yet
a corporation may, after taking into account the increase in its federal corporate income tax,
receive less than $2. The difference between what a state forgoes and what the corporation re-
ceives inures to the benefit of the federal fise, revenue sharing in reverse.
Fourth, differences in state and local taxes may reflect differences in the level and quality of
state and local public services, which also affect business locational decisions. Low taxes are not
necessarily an attraction to businesses if a firm will have to supply at its own expense what is
supplied through the public sector in other states or other jurisdictions. Furthermore, if low taxes
mean inferior schools, a state may lack the educated and literate labor force that is essential to
certain types of businesses.
Fifth, to the extent that tax rate differentials are capitalized, their impact will be reduced.
For example, low property taxes in one jurisdiction might mean that land sells for a higher price
there than it would sell for in another jurisdiction having higher property taxes. In other words,
land located in a high-property tax jurisdiction,may sell for less than an equivalent parcel of land
in a low-tax jurisdiction, assuming that differences in taxation are not reflected in differences in
public services, which might also be capitalized.
Sixth, most companies contemplating a major locational decision plan to stay at their new
site years longer than any group of elected officials are likely to be in office. Consequently, current
tax levels, special concessions, or special features of the tax law may not be a reliable basis upon
which to make a multi-million dollar investment. What one group of legislators might grant today
by way of concession another might eliminate tomorrow, especially if financial conditions change
significantly.
Seventh, state tax incentives may contain their own seeds of destruction. If incentives are
effective at all, a state will gain only a short-lived advantage over other states because they can be
expected to adopt similar ones. A tax incentive that is adopted by all states, however, is equivalent
in its effect on locational decisions to no incentive at all, except that tax revenue is needlessly lost.
In reality, states are often afraid of letting any other state obtain an advantage, and thus tax
incentives are often adopted without evaluating the results that occurred eleswhere.
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special tax provisions is the greatest,49 but ironically it is then that a
state can least afford any inefficiency, waste, or slippage in its tax
structure.
A MISGUIDED APPROACH TO STATE TAX POLICY
New York has probably squandered any state's greatest asset in
the area of taxation: a broad and relatively pure tax base, free of re-
fined and moralistic judgments, coupled with the low rates that a broad
base facilitates. A state simply does not have to fine-tune its system the
way the Congress feels it must in the context of federal marginal rates
that can reach forty-six percent in the corporate income tax and fifty
percent in the personal income tax. With its lower tax rates, a state can
avoid becoming entangled with all of the rarefied distinctions that char-
acterize the federal system and that lead to its spiralling complexity.e°
Indeed, the administrative cost of many of these distinctions found in
New York law may actually exceed any benefits that inure to the state.
The view being expressed, that a broad tax base and lower rates
are desirable, is no different from the philosophy underlying the various
income tax proposals being discussed in Washington. There is, however,
a critical difference. Because of a state's comparatively low rates, a
legislature has much less to fear than does the Congress about the eco.'-
nomic consequences that might flow from eliminating many of a state's
existing provisions.
As an illustration, consider a state like New York that allows all
of the itemized deductions that a taxpayer claims under the federal
personal income tax. Examined individually, each itemized deduction
can be questioned at the state level. The deduction for charitable con-
tributions provides one case. A combination of introspection and a non-
scientific survey of tax lawyers and accountants leads to the conclusion
that few, if any, taxpayers would contribute less to charities if New
York eliminated this itemized deduction. For example, a taxpayer sub-
ject to New York's highest marginal tax rate on earned income-tell
percent-saves $100 in state income tax by making a $1,000 charitable
49. A survey by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations found that support
for business tax incentives is strongest where economic growth has been slowest. See Vaughan.
State Tax Incentives: How Effective Are They?, CUED COMMENTARY, Jan. 1980, at 3.
50. Once the bases of the major taxes were relatively pure, the legislature could then address
such issues as the proper share of revenue that should be raised from each source. Revenue
shortfalls could be dealt with through the use of surtaxes rather than by adopting new provisions
under severe time constraints.
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contribution ($1,000 x 10%). The net out-of-pocket savings are actually
less, however, because the $100 reduction in state tax increases the tax-
payer's federal income tax. If the taxpayer is subject to a fifty percent
federal marginal tax rate, the $100 reduction in state tax increases his
or her federal taxes by $50 ($100 x 50%), so that the net out-of-pocket
savings are only $50 ($100-$50). Compared with the $500 that this
taxpayer saves federally ($1000 x 50%), the additional net state savings
of $50 may have no effect on a decision whether to contribute to char-
ity; that decision may be driven solely by federal considerations.
New York's deduction for charitable contributions is questionable
for yet another reason. New York residents can claim the deduction
regardless of the identity of the charity and the location of its benefi-
ciaries. For state tax purposes, a contribution to an out-of-state univer-
sity or to a charity with exclusively non-New York beneficiaries is iden-
tical to a contribution to a charity that aids the homeless in New York
City. For federal purposes, these differences should be irrelevant; for
state purposes, however, perhaps such differences should not be
ignored.51
Similar issues can be raised regarding most of the other itemized
deductions. These questions cannot be easily dismissed because the
price paid for any unnecessary or inefficient base erosion is a combina-
tion of reduced government goods and services and higher rates of tax
than would otherwise be required. If itemized deductions were elimi-
nated in New York, for example, $1.6 billion in revenue would become
available5 2 and could be used to reduce tax rates and to increase ser-
vices. Further, higher taxes or reduced services create additional pres-
sure on a legislature to enact special relief provisions, and these merely
51. A number of states limit their charitable contribution to only in-state activities. Michigan,
for example, provides a tax benefit for: (1) amounts contributed to Michigan colleges and univer-
sities, including fund raising agencies under their control; (2) the Michigan Colleges Foundation;
and (3) public libraries and public broadcasting stations located in Michigan. Micu. ComP. LAws
§ 7.557 (1960). Indiana and North Dakota follow somewhat similar rules. See IND. CODE § 6-3-3-
5 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-01.7 (1983). Illinois recognizes only contributions to
designated groups, such as the Illinois Non-Game Wildlife Conservation Fund, and the Illinois
Veterans Home Fund. 1983 Il. Laws 406, 1052.
The charitable deduction has been defended as part of the normative structure of an income
tax. See Andrews, supra note 16, at 344-75. If this view is accepted, arguments about the em-
ciency of the deduction in stimulating charitable contributions become irrelevant. The federal de-
duction for charitable contributions, however, is generally described as a subsidy to charitable
giving and characterized as a tax expenditure. See supra note 37 for a discussion regarding the
tax expenditure budget.




result in another cycle of more base erosion and still higher taxes or
reduced services."
The preceding examples and discussion suggest that New York,
like so many other states, has proceeded totally backwards in develop-
ing its tax laws by adopting inefficient and misguided measures that
erode the tax base, increase the administrative burden on taxpayers
and the tax department, and result in upward pressure on tax rates.
This trend must be reversed; the legislature must stop worrying about
Tang, Awake, miniature marshmallows, and Head and Shoulders
shampoo and return the tax system to its basics.
The test of a state tax system should not be what new provisions
can be piled upon an existing, cumbersome tax structure-that test is
limited only by legislative imagination, something never in short sup-
ply. The test ought to be what can be deleted from the tax structure
without sacrificing anything of value. At the federal level, it is some-
times asserted that a conflict exists between simplicity and equity; a
complex system is needed in order to draw those distinctions that make
the system fairer. At the state level, however, simplicity and equity
should be viewed as allies. And one of the goals of any tax study com-
mission should be to design a tax structure in which equity and simplic-
ity can co-exist.
53. From a business lobbyist's perspective, the combination of high nominal rates and a nar-
row tax base may be preferable to low nominal rates and a broad base. A high nominal rate
provides an effective club that can be waved in order to persuade a legislator to support some
arcane change in the tax law. One of a lobbyist's predictable tools-the incantation of "business
climate" and "economic development"-depends on high nominal rates for maximum impact.
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